Two Worlds Apart: Why the Rigveda and the Upaniṣads Cannot Be Reconciled

In dominant narratives of Indian philosophy, the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads are treated as points along a single spiritual arc—progressing neatly from ritual to renunciation, from sacrifice to self-realization. This portrayal, however, is a carefully constructed illusion, born of Brahmanical attempts to maintain continuity where there is in fact rupture. A closer, text-sensitive reading reveals that the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads represent two incommensurable worldviews, rooted in different historical, sociological, and philosophical milieus. More importantly, the Upaniṣads appear after the Śramaṇa traditions of Jainism and Buddhism were already well-developed, and attempt to appropriate their core insights.

We must be clear from the start: these are not two layers of one evolving system. These are two competing ideologies—the former priestly and the latter renunciatory; the former ritualistic and the latter philosophical; the former exclusive and the latter, in many ways, democratic.

I. The Literary Divide: Hymns vs Dialogues

The Ṛgveda (c. 1500–1200 BCE) is the oldest extant Indo-Aryan text. Its hymns (sūktas) are directed at deities like Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, and Sūrya. They are composed in praise of sacrificial acts, designed to maintain ṛta (cosmic order), and aimed at securing this-worldly goods: wealth, sons, cattle, and victory.

For instance:

“We invoke Agni, the priest of the sacrifice, the divine minister of the offering, the invoker, bestower of wealth.”
— Ṛgveda 1.1.1

There is no concept of liberation (mokṣa), karma, or rebirth. Afterlife, where referenced, involves the pitṛloka (world of ancestors) or reunion with the gods—not escape from the cycle of existence.

In contrast, the Upaniṣads—particularly the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya (c. 6th–5th century BCE or later)—are dialogic and introspective. They contain no hymns, no gods to be propitiated, and only passing reference to yajña. Instead, they are concerned with ātman, brahman, karma, and mokṣa.

Consider this exchange:

“As a man acts, so does he become… A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.”
— Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5

This philosophical turn has no precedent in the Ṛgveda.

Patrick Olivelle observes that the Upaniṣads are a “radical break with the ritualistic worldview” and notes their form resembles Śramaṇa dialogues rather than Vedic invocations:

“The Upaniṣads’ dialogic style and interest in personal liberation are without Vedic precedent… They are closer in structure and concern to the Suttas of early Buddhism.”
— Olivelle, The Early Upaniṣads (1998), Introduction, p. 18

Olivelle draws this conclusion by comparing the Upaniṣadic method of teaching—such as Yājñavalkya’s conversations with Janaka and Maitreyī (BṛU 2.4, 4.5)—with the Dīgha Nikāya dialogues of the Buddha (e.g. Sāmaññaphala Sutta, DN 2), where renunciation, meditation, and liberation are central.

II. Contradictory Philosophies: Vedic Sacrifice vs Śramaṇa Liberation

The Ṛgveda assumes a cosmically ordered, hierarchical universe, where correct performance of ritual maintains divine-human equilibrium. Humans are not bound by karma but are creatures whose fate is determined by the blessings of the gods and the efficiency of sacrificial rites.

In Ṛgveda 10.16.1–6, for example, the funeral hymn speaks of sending the dead to the pitṛs, and of rejoining the earth—not escaping it.

“Go hence, O Death, pursue your own path… may your eye go to the sun, your life to the wind, as prescribed by the immortal.”
— Ṛgveda 10.16.3

No doctrine of rebirth, let alone mokṣa.

Now consider the Upaniṣadic concern with liberation from rebirth:

“When all the desires clinging to one’s heart fall away, then the mortal becomes immortal.”
— Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.3.14

Where did this turn come from?

Johannes Bronkhorst argues that such doctrines were imported into Brahmanical texts from a separate cultural zone he calls Greater Magadha, which he defines as the geographic and cultural cradle of Śramaṇa traditions:

“The idea of rebirth, karmic retribution, and liberation from saṃsāra, were central to the worldview of Greater Magadha, and absent in Vedic ritualism. The Upaniṣads adopt these ideas under the pressure of Śramaṇa ideologies.”
— Bronkhorst, Greater Magadha (2007), pp. 8–10

To support this, he contrasts Ṛgvedic hymns with early Jain and Buddhist texts (e.g. Ācāranga Sūtra, Dhammapada, Sutta Nipāta) that clearly articulate karma, rebirth, and liberation, often as early as the 6th century BCE.

In Jain texts like Ācāranga Sūtra 1.2.1:

“The liberated soul, who knows and renounces karma, breaks the cycle of rebirth and becomes a siddha.”

And in Sutta Nipāta 1071 (Parābhava Sutta):

“The fool who does evil deeds, thinking, ‘No one sees me,’ is reborn into misery—this is the law of karma.”

These ideas appear in Buddhist and Jain texts with maturity and consistency, long before they are systematized in the Upaniṣads.

III. The Dating Debate: Upaniṣads After the Buddha

Let us now address the common assertion that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya were composed before the Buddha. This view is largely based on circular reasoning—assuming Brahmanical antiquity because of later dominance.

But there is no mention of the Upaniṣads in early Buddhist texts—while the inverse is true: Upaniṣads echo or respond to established Śramaṇa concepts.

Bronkhorst remarks:

“Early Buddhist texts rarely if ever cite Brahmanical texts, yet Upaniṣadic thought frequently shows responses to Buddhist categories, particularly in the abstraction of ātman.”
— Greater Magadha, p. 408

M.L. Joshi, who conducted extensive comparative studies of early Brahmanical and Buddhist materials, notes:

“The earliest Buddhist suttas do not mention any Upaniṣadic thinkers or doctrines. But several Upaniṣadic sections, like the neti-neti (‘not this, not that’) in Bṛhadāraṇyaka, show signs of reacting to Buddhist anatta and śūnyatā.”
— Joshi, Development of Indian Thought (1999), p. 115

In Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.5.15, Yājñavalkya says:

“This self is not this, not that (neti neti)…”

Compare with the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (SN 22.59), where the Buddha deconstructs identity through the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness), declaring none of them to be the self.

If the Upaniṣads were prior, we would expect the Buddha to engage them directly—but he doesn’t. He engages Brahmins, yes, but not their metaphysics. This silence is damning.

IV. Political Strategy: Śramaṇa Ideas Recast in Brahmanical Form

By the late Upaniṣadic period, Śramaṇa ideals—renunciation, meditation, moral causality—had gained mass appeal. The Brahminical response was not opposition, but appropriation. This meant taking Śramaṇa doctrines and wrapping them in Vedic prestige: karma was now tied to caste duty; liberation could be achieved by knowing the ātman, which of course, only the Brahmin could teach.

Brian Black emphasizes that the Upaniṣads were not radical rejections of Veda, but strategic realignments:

“The Upaniṣads internalize the ritual, replacing outer fire with inner fire. This allowed Brahmins to retain authority even as renunciation became normative.”
— The Character of the Self in Ancient India (2007), p. 123

So, when Yājñavalkya speaks of ātman as the innermost reality, he is repurposing Śramaṇic introspection—but integrating it into the caste-hierarchy-preserving discourse of brahman.

The radical democratizing potential of Śramaṇa liberation was thus neutralized by Brahmanical metaphysics.

Conclusion: The Myth of Continuity

The Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads are not “early” and “late” stages of the same tradition. They are two different traditions: one priestly and sacrificial, the other philosophical and renunciatory. Their concepts, aims, and worldviews are not merely different—they are incompatible. And the direction of influence is clear: the Upaniṣads were composed after the Buddha, in response to Śramaṇa critiques of ritualism.

It is time to stop collapsing Indian philosophy into a single Brahmanical narrative. What we call “Hindu philosophy” today was born out of a centuries-long ideological contestation—one in which the Śramaṇas led, and the Brahmins followed.